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
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Authoritarian Personality

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Abstract

The theory of an authoritarian personality was an influential though controversial mid-twentieth-century theory to explain the mass appeal of fascism and ethnocentrism. Methodological and conceptual criticisms of the original theory, however, led to alternative theories and culminated in research suggesting two distinct dimensions of ideological attitudes, Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) or Social Conservatism and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) or Anti-Egalitarianism. RWA and SDO were initially thought to be direct expressions of two different authoritarian personalities, but have more recently been seen as describing social or ideological attitude dimensions with multiple social and personal determinants.

The idea of an authoritarian personality emerged in the 1930s as an attempt to explain the popular appeal of fascist movements, such as the Nazis, in many European societies. At that time, European philosophy and social science was strongly influenced by Marxism, and a major prediction from Marxism was that the crisis engendered by the Great Depression should radicalize the working classes and lead to socialist revolutions. This expectation, however, was confounded in much of Europe where the crisis did not produce socialist revolutions but resulted in mass support for fascist movements advocating authoritarian leadership and virulent anti-Semitism. The explanation proposed was that a particular kind of authoritarian personality, which had become socially widespread, would under threatening conditions make people emotionally and cognitively vulnerable to the appeal of fascist ideologies and to ethnocentric hostility to vulnerable minorities.

Reich (1975), for example, argued that capitalist social structures were characterized by punitive families, which used child-rearing practices involving extensive sexual repression to create authoritarian personalities, who would be unlikely to rebel against exploitative social conditions and yearn for powerful leadership. This authoritarian character structure was described as conservative, afraid of freedom, submissive to authority, obedient, yet with 'natural aggression distorted into brutal sadism' (p. 66). Maslow (1943) and Fromm (1941) produced similar descriptions of an authoritarian personality to explain the appeal of fascist movements and ideologies.

These early theories were speculative and did not develop empirically based measures of their constructs. As a result, they produced little research. However, their core idea that social and ideological beliefs are a direct expression of basic needs in the personality did later prove highly influential and dominated much of social scientific thought and theory about the psychological bases of ideology and prejudice for much of the rest of the twentieth century.

Original Theory of the Authoritarian Personality and the F Scale

It was in 1950 with the publication of a classic volume titled *The Authoritarian Personality* that these ideas finally became prominent in the social sciences. In this volume the authors

(Adorno et al., 1950) theoretically elaborated a theory of the authoritarian personality and reported the results of a multi-pronged decade-long program of research testing the theory. Their investigation had begun with the objective of explaining the psychological bases of anti-Semitism. This was shown to be part of a much broader ethnocentric pattern involving a generalized dislike of out-groups and minorities, as well as an excessive and uncritical Nationalism. Anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism were also strongly related to political and economic conservatism. These attitudes and beliefs appeared to cluster together to form a coherent pattern, and this patterning seemed best explained as an expression of basic needs within the personality.

Evidence from a number of sources and particularly their own research comparing persons high and low in ethnocentrism on indices and ratings scored blind from interview data, and projective test protocols suggested that a constellation of nine tightly covarying traits characterized this authoritarian personality syndrome. Moreover, these traits seemed to be directly expressed in particular 'implicitly antidemocratic,' or authoritarian, attitudes and beliefs. This meant that it would be possible to identify authoritarian personalities by the degree to which people would agree with these 'implicitly antidemocratic' attitudes and beliefs. On this basis, Adorno et al. (1950) developed their famous F scale consisting of items expressing attitudes which were believed to be direct expressions of each of the nine 'traits' of the authoritarian personality syndrome. These nine 'traits' are listed below with their gist definitions in parentheses followed by an example in quotation marks:

- *Conventionalism* (rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values): "A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people."
- *Authoritarian submission* (a submissive, uncritical attitude toward authorities): "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn."
- *Authoritarian aggression* (tendency to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values): "Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals, and ought to be severely punished."
- *Anti-intraception* (opposition to the subjective, imaginative, and tender-minded): "Nowadays more and more people are

prying into matters that should remain personal and private."

- *Superstition and stereotypy* (belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate, disposition to think in rigid categories): "Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things."
- *Power and toughness* (preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power, strength, toughness): "People can be divided into two distinct classes, the weak and the strong."
- *Destructiveness and cynicism* (generalized hostility, vilification of the human): "Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict."
- *Projectivity* (disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outward of unconscious emotional impulses): "Most people do not realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places."
- *Sex* (an exaggerated concern with sexual 'goings-on'): "The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the 'goings-on' in these regions, even in places where people might least expect it."

Adorno et al.'s (1950) theoretical explanation for the origin of this authoritarian personality drew heavily on psychodynamic theory. It suggested that overstrict, harsh, and punitive parental socialization sets up an enduring conflict within the individual. In this conflict, parental punitiveness engenders resentment and hostility toward parental authority and by extension all authority, but cannot be expressed because of fear of and dependence on the all-powerful parents. The anger and hostility are therefore repressed and replaced by an uncritical idealization of the parents and conventional authority and submission to them. The repressed anger and hostility toward authority does not disappear but is displaced and directed toward substitute targets, notably those seen as being sanctioned by conventional authority, such as vulnerable and culturally deviant out-groups and minorities. These inner impulses and conflicts are then directly expressed in the nine surface trait components of the authoritarian personality and those implicit antidemocratic beliefs sampled by the F scale.

Initially, this theory inspired a great deal of enthusiasm. It seemed to effectively tie together concepts over an extremely broad range – from individual psychodynamics to sociological phenomena of immense significance for human society and history. In the two decades following the publication of their book, the F scale was used in hundreds of studies as a measure of an authoritarian personality dimension. These studies confirmed that scores on the F scale were strongly correlated to right-wing attitudes, political conservatism, nationalism, and generalized prejudice against out-groups and minorities (see, e.g., the review by Brown, 1965).

Critical Reaction to the Original Authoritarian Personality Theory

Adorno et al.'s (1950) theory and research, however, also generated a great deal of criticism (see, e.g., Christie and Jahoda, 1954). First, subsequent research could not find clear

support for the psychodynamic propositions of their theory. Second, much of their research validating the F scale, which compared high- and low-prejudice participants, seemed seriously compromised because of their failure to use blind ratings and control for sociodemographic and other group differences. Third, their theory and concepts seemed to explain only authoritarianism of the political right and ignored authoritarianism of the left. And, fourth, the F scale became a particular focus of controversy, because all its items were positively worded, so that agreement always indicated high authoritarianism, and disagreement low authoritarianism. One consequence of this was that acquiescence (or the tendency of people to agree rather than disagree) might influence scores on the F scale. A further and more serious consequence in psychometric terms was that acquiescence might have inflated or even caused the apparently high level of covariation between the items of the F scale. If so, the apparent reliability of the F scale might be spurious and it might not be measuring a single personality trait dimension after all.

Most critics did feel, however, that despite its flaws, the two most basic tenets of the theory were valid. These were the assumptions that social attitudes and beliefs were meaningfully organized along a single broad ideological dimension and that these attitudes were direct expressions of personality. A number of subsequent studies therefore focused on trying to remedy the weaknesses of Adorno et al.'s (1950) original research. One important goal of this research was to try and 'balance' the F scale, that is, to produce an F scale that would contain equal numbers of pro- and anti-authoritarian items so that the total scale score would not be influenced by acquiescence. These attempts generally failed with the resulting balanced F scales having very low internal consistencies, that is, the items simply did not correlate sufficiently strongly to indicate that they were measuring a single unitary syndrome and therefore could not be expressive of a particular personality dimension (see, e.g., Altemeyer, 1981). Most researchers on the topic were reluctant to abandon such a core proposition of the theory and preferred to conclude that failure to develop adequately balanced versions of the F scale was because the nature of its items made it difficult to psychologically reverse their meaning. The alternative possibility that the F scale might simply be covering a range of item content that was not unidimensional was not seriously investigated until very much later.

The failure to balance the F scale and the many other criticisms of the original theory did also result in attempts to develop a better theory and measure of the authoritarian personality. These all shared the basic assumption of the original theory, which was that social attitudes in general were ideologically organized along a single dimension that was a direct expression of personality.

Alternative Theories of the Authoritarian Personality

In his book, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Gordon Allport (1954) described the kind of personality that would be generally prejudiced against out-groups and minorities, which closely followed Adorno et al.'s (1950) nine surface traits of their authoritarian personality. Allport, however, largely discarded the idea that these traits were the result of inner psychodynamic

conflict and instead proposed that they stemmed from personal insecurity and fearfulness, or 'ego weakness.' This personal insecurity and fearfulness, he suggested, would cause authoritarian personalities to need structure, order, and control in their social environments and to react with punitive hostility to social change, deviance from convention, and novelty. Allport did not develop a measure of his concept of the authoritarian personality so that his ideas never acquired prominence of those of Adorno et al. (1950), but his simplified conceptualization was broadly adopted by later theorists, such as Wilson (1973) and Altemeyer (1981) who did develop influential new measures.

A second reconceptualization was proposed by Rokeach (1954), who suggested that the core characteristic of the authoritarian personality was a rigid cognitive style, characterized by "a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs ... organized around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority" (p. 195), which he therefore named Dogmatism. Persons high in dogmatism would be attracted to authoritarian movements and beliefs of either the political right or the left, and cause them to dislike and reject persons and out-groups with dissimilar beliefs and values to their own.

Rokeach (1960) developed a D scale to measure dogmatism, but it shared many of the flaws of the F scale. The items of the D scale did not seem to directly assess a cognitive style, but tended to be broad statements of opinion or social attitude that were often very similar to those of the F scale. Not surprisingly, therefore, research found that the D scale correlated so highly with the F scale that there seemed to be little difference in what they were measuring. In addition, the items of the D scale were also all formulated so that agreement always indicated high dogmatism so that it shared with the F scale the problem of being potentially contaminated by acquiescent responding. As with the F scale, attempts to balance the items of the D scale also resulted in the collapse of internal consistency of the scale. This suggested that the items of the D scale, like the F scale, could not be assessing a single personality or cognitive style dimension.

A third alternative conceptualization of the authoritarian personality was proposed by Wilson (1973), which he named Conservatism. Closely following Allport (1954), Wilson suggested that the basic personality characteristic involved in conservatism was a generalized susceptibility to experience threat or anxiety when confronted by uncertainty (p. 259). As a result, such personalities would adopt authoritarian or conservative social attitudes, which he developed a conservatism or C scale to measure. The items of the C scale consisted of attitudinal statements expressing dislike for and resistance to change, novelty, and diversity, and a preference for order, structure, tradition, and convention.

The C scale did improve on its predecessors by using items for which high Conservatism required both agreement and disagreement and so controlling acquiescent responding. Unfortunately, it also shared its predecessors' weakness, when balanced, of having extremely low internal consistencies with a typical mean correlation between its items being only about 0.05 (Altemeyer, 1981). This indicated that, like the F and D scales, also the C scale could not be measuring a unidimensional construct. Factor analytic studies of the C scale also did not reveal a meaningful factor structure that would enable the

extraction of a unidimensional core of items. Finally, the items of the C scale were also similar in content to those of the F and D scales and it also correlated highly with the F and D scales suggesting little or no differentiation between what these scales were measuring.

In general, therefore, none of these alternatives to the original F scale managed to resolve the primary problem that their items, when balanced, did not covary sufficiently to indicate that they were measuring a single unitary construct. This meant that despite the appeal of the theories of an authoritarian (or dogmatic, or conservative) personality, none was able to produce a valid measure of such a personality dimension. As a result, by the end of the 1970s social scientists had largely lost interest in the idea that an authoritarian personality might be the underlying cause of people's ideological convictions. In the 1980s, however, an important new research revived the idea of an authoritarian personality.

Altemeyer's Authoritarian Personality

In 1981 an important book by Bob Altemeyer finally reported the successful development of a fully balanced and psychometrically sound Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale to measure the authoritarian personality. The point of departure for Altemeyer's decade-long program of research had been his view that Adorno et al.'s (1950) nine traits and their attitudinal expressions in the F scale were far too broad to delineate a single unitary dimension. His research instead suggested that only three of the original nine traits and their corresponding attitudinal expressions were correlated together strongly enough to describe a unitary dimension. The three traits were 'conventionalism,' 'authoritarian submission,' and 'authoritarian aggression' and the items of the RWA scale were therefore limited only to attitudinal expressions of these three components. Altemeyer (1981) therefore defined RWA, which he saw as direct measure of the authoritarian personality syndrome, as consisting of the covariation of these three highly correlated traits (Altemeyer, 1981: pp. 147–148). A series of validation studies revealed that the RWA scale had excellent psychometric properties. Despite its items being balanced against acquiescence, they showed a high level of internal consistency and seemed to be assessing a single unitary dimension. Moreover, it substantially outperformed a number of earlier measures of the authoritarian personality in predicting presumed effects of RWA, such as holding right-wing political attitudes, generalized prejudice against out-groups and minorities, and support for punitive and unjust actions by established authorities against persons or groups regarded as deviant.

A series of subsequent studies by Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) explored the psychological origins of RWA. Consistent with prior findings using the F scale, there was little support for Adorno et al.'s (1950) original psychoanalytic theory. Thus, correlations between parental punitiveness and strictness in child rearing and the RWA scores of their offspring were weak or not significant. Moreover, signs of repressed aggression in daydreams and fantasies were no more common among high than among low RWA scorers. Altemeyer's (1996) findings also suggested that RWA did not develop in early childhood but was largely formed through social learning and personal

experiences and crystallized during late adolescence. Moreover, despite RWA scale scores being generally stable over time, his research also showed that they could be substantially changed by experiences throughout the life cycle. Thus, RWA decreased substantially with liberal higher education, increased as a result of becoming a parent, and increased in response to threatening social crises. His research also showed that high scorers on the RWA scale seemed to have been socialized to view the world as a dangerous and threatening place, and that this motivated authoritarian behavior, such as aggression and punitiveness, toward persons targeted by the authorities.

A Second Authoritarian Personality?

Another important development in authoritarianism research came in the 1990s with the concept of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). SDO was conceptualized as a “general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” (Pratto et al., 1994: p. 742), and measured by a highly reliable and unidimensional SDO scale with items such as ‘Inferior groups should stay in their place’ (agreement indicating high SDO) and ‘No one group should dominate in society’ (agreement indicating low SDO).

Although the item content of the SDO scale was therefore quite different from that of the RWA scale, and scores on the two scales were generally not correlated or only very weakly correlated, some striking similarities between the two measures soon became apparent. Both were strong predictors of right-wing political attitudes, as well as nationalism, militarism, and support for tough, undemocratic, authoritarian government. Both also strongly predicted generalized prejudice against outgroups and minorities. Finally, the social attitudes comprising SDO were, at least initially, also seen by Pratto et al. (1994) as direct expressions of a basic personality dimension. Altemeyer (1998) noted that the RWA and SDO scales seem to relate to different sets of the original nine ‘trait’ clusters listed by Adorno et al. (1950), and therefore concluded that these scales measure two different kinds of authoritarian personality dimensions (the ‘submissive’ and the ‘dominant’).

The idea that there are two ‘authoritarian’ dimensions did help to explain the checkered history of the authoritarian personality and the difficulties of the early theorists. In retrospect, it was apparent that Adorno et al.’s (1950) original conceptualization of the authoritarian personality and their F scale combined these two dimensions and syndromes, resulting in its lack of unidimensionality. Allport (1954), Rokeach (1960), and Wilson (1973) had attempted to simplify the conceptualization of this personality tending to focus on characteristics of the ‘submissive’ authoritarian, but they failed to narrow their measures correspondingly, which remained multidimensional. The success of Altemeyer’s (1981) RWA scale thus seems largely because of him having stripped off those items tapping the factorially different ‘authoritarian dominance’ syndrome in his item development studies, which had now reemerged in the SDO scale.

Further research by Altemeyer (1998) and others (Duckitt, 2001; Duriez and Van Hiel, 2002; Van Hiel and Mervelde,

2002) confirmed that RWA and SDO, despite their common ideological outcomes, were two independent, individual, different dimensions correlating quite differently with a range of other variables. RWA was powerfully associated with religiosity and valuing order, structure, conformity, and tradition, seeing the social world as a dangerous place influenced by social threat, while SDO was not. SDO, on the other hand was strongly associated with valuing power, achievement, and hedonism, being male, and with a Social Darwinist view of the world as a ruthlessly competitive jungle in which the strong win and the weak lose, while RWA was not.

By the turn of the century, therefore, Altemeyer’s (1998) conclusion that two quite different personality dimensions underlay people’s ideological beliefs and a wide range of related social attitudes and behaviors had come to be widely shared by researchers. During the next decade, however, the assumption that these were personality dimensions came to be seriously questioned leading to the development of new theoretical models of the psychological bases of ideology.

The New Critique of the Idea of Authoritarian Personalities

A major criticism of the theory of an authoritarian personality, or personalities, which gathered force during the next decade, was that neither the RWA or SDO scale, nor indeed any of their predecessors, such as the F, D, and C scales, actually measured personality (Duckitt, 1989, 2001; Feldman, 2003; Van Hiel and Mervelde, 2002). The items of all these psychometric measures consisted entirely of statements of belief and attitude of a broadly ideological nature and did not describe behavioral dispositions or tendencies as the items of personality inventories typically do. Indeed, after their initial article presenting the SDO scale, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have generally described it as a measure of enduring beliefs rather than of personality. The idea that the social attitude and belief items comprising the RWA and SDO scales measure personality was therefore merely an assumption that had never been empirically demonstrated. This meant that these scales were better construed as measuring exactly what their item content specified, that is, social and ideological attitudes or value dimensions.

There was also empirical support for the contention that the RWA and SDO scales were measures of attitude or value dimensions rather than personality. For example, Altemeyer’s (1996) own research had shown that RWA did not seem to be established in childhood as one might expect for a personality trait, but only in late adolescence through a process of social learning. Moreover, although individuals’ level of RWA once established seemed to remain reasonably stable during adulthood, it could be markedly altered by changes in their social situations or life experience, such as higher education, becoming a parent, or confronting threatening sociopolitical crises, which again seemed more consistent with it being an attitudinal construct rather than personality. In addition, studies investigating the structure of sociopolitical attitudes and sociocultural values had typically revealed two roughly orthogonal dimensions, with one corresponding closely to and correlating strongly with RWA, and the other to SDO

(Duckitt and Sibley, 2009: Table 1; see also; Duriez and Van Hiel, 2002; Duriez et al., 2005; Saucier, 2000). Again, therefore, these findings suggested that RWA and SDO were measuring social attitudes or values rather than personality.

Finally, research has shown that both RWA and SDO were powerfully influenced by social situational factors. Thus, social threats (such as social, economic, political crises, and instability) assessed at both the societal and the individual level significantly increased societal or individual levels of authoritarianism, whether measured by the F, C, or RWA scale or by independent ratings (e.g., Doty et al., 1991; Duckitt and Fisher, 2003; McCann, 1999; Sales, 1973). The role of threat as a possible primary explanation for RWA, had been, however, largely ignored by theorists, presumably because it did not fit well with the prevailing assumption that authoritarian attitudes were a direct expression of personality. In addition, research has shown that SDO was markedly influenced by membership of dominant social groups, and will shift accordingly when in-group power and status changes (Huang and Liu, 2005).

Beyond the Authoritarian Personality

This critique of the idea of an authoritarian personality (or personalities) has led to the emergence of new theories conceptualizing authoritarianism not as personality but as social attitude and value dimensions (Duckitt, 1989, 2001; Duriez and Van Hiel, 2002; Feldman, 2003; Kreindler, 2005). This reconceptualization has opened up issues and questions that had largely been ignored because of the personality assumption. First, an issue that had been completely neglected in the case of RWA (though less so for SDO), was that of identifying the central, core value or set of values underlying the seemingly diverse attitudinal content of the RWA scale's items that resulted in them cohering together to form a single unitary ideological dimension. The second has been the issue of what personal or social factors causally influence people's adoption of the ideological attitudes assessed by the RWA and SDO scales? And third, how do these social and ideological attitudes influence social outcomes such as generalized prejudice against out-groups and minorities?

An early alternative to the personality concept of authoritarianism was the group cohesion model of RWA (Duckitt, 1989). Although this model did not generate much research itself, its core ideas were adopted by more influential later models. The group cohesion model saw RWA as a social attitude dimension of a broadly ideological nature, and not as a personality dimension. It proposed that the three components of RWA identified by Altemeyer (1981) were not covarying personality traits, but attitudinal clusters, which covaried tightly together because all the three expressed the motivational goal or value of group cohesion, articulated in attitudes favoring the subordination of individual autonomy and self-expression to group cohesion and authority. Thus, Altemeyer's (1981) 'conventionalism' component was expressed in attitudes favoring the maintenance of the traditional norms of the group, his 'authoritarian submission' in attitudes favoring obedience and respect to group leaders and authorities, and his 'authoritarian aggression' in attitudes favoring punitiveness toward those who violated traditional

group norms and conventions. This model suggested that the degree to which people would value group cohesion and therefore hold authoritarian attitudes would be jointly determined by the degree to which they identified with their social group and perceived threats to it. Out-group dislike or prejudice would therefore be caused by perceiving out-groups as threatening in-group cohesion or security in some way.

An interesting implication of this theory was that authoritarian attitudes could be held in respect of any social group. The items of the RWA scale (and of its predecessors) were formulated at the societal or national level so that the RWA scale measured authoritarian attitudes only in relation to the individual's society or nation. This group cohesion model was later elaborated by Stellmacher and Patzel (2005), who developed a General Authoritarianism scale with items that could be applied to any social group and so measure authoritarian attitudes in relation to any group (e.g., such as political parties).

A second theory influenced by the group cohesion model was proposed by Feldman (2003). He also viewed RWA, or at least its core authoritarian submission items, as an attitudinal expression of the value of group conformity or cohesion as opposed to individual autonomy. Feldman's theory did not attempt to explain what caused individuals to adopt the authoritarian values of group conformity or cohesion, but did suggest that once they held these values their perception of threats to cohesion and conformity in their groups would cause them to adopt and support authoritarian policies and actions (this included Altemeyer's 'authoritarian aggression' component) and direct prejudice at those seen as threatening in-group cohesion and conformity.

A third model influenced by the group cohesion Model was Kreindler's (2005) Dual Group Processes Model (DGPM), which also saw authoritarianism as a group phenomenon, and therefore potentially applicable to any social group. Like the group cohesion model the DGPM saw the primary causal determinant of RWA as identification with a group which was experiencing threats to its core norms, which caused hostility to those seen as responsible for these normative threats. The DGPM extended this group identification hypothesis to explain SDO as well, which it suggested was caused by identification with high status or dominant groups that resulted in high-group identifiers valuing inequality, hierarchy, and group dominance, and derogating members of lower status groups.

The most comprehensive and best researched theory deriving from the original group cohesion model has been the dual process model (DPM) of ideology and prejudice (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt and Sibley, 2009). The DPM proposes that RWA and SDO are social attitudinal expressions of two different basic value or motivational goal dimensions that are made salient for individuals by their personalities and socialized worldview beliefs. Following the group cohesion approach, the DPM proposes that RWA is an expression of the motivational goals or values of collective security and cohesion, which is causally influenced by personality (the Big Five trait dimensions of low openness and high conscientiousness) and the belief acquired through socialization that the social world is a dangerous and threatening (as opposed to safe and secure) place. SDO is seen as an attitudinal expression of the motivational goal or value of power, dominance, and superiority over others, which is causally influenced by the Big Five personality

trait dimension of low agreeableness and the belief that the social world is a ruthlessly competitive jungle in which the strong win and weak lose (as opposed to a cooperative place where people share with and care for each other). Because people high in RWA value collective security and cohesion, they will direct prejudice and hostility toward persons and groups seen as threatening collective security and cohesion. Persons high in SDO, on the other hand, value power, dominance, and superiority over others and will therefore derogate and dislike out-groups low in power or status (in order to justify their relatively superiority) and out-groups competing with their own group over relative power and status.

Finally, a motivated cognition theory of ideology has been proposed by Jost and his colleagues (Jost et al., 2003), which has similarities to the DPM and group cohesion theories, but also important differences. This theory sees RWA (and related constructs, such as the F, C, or D scales) as expressing attitudinal resistance to change, and SDO as expressing attitudinal support for inequality, as two components of a single higher order political conservatism dimension. Conservatism, and therefore both RWA and SDO, express motives to manage and control threat and uncertainty, which arise from social situational factors likely to activate threat and uncertainty, and dispositional factors indexing personal needs to avoid uncertainty and threat. Jost et al.'s (2003) motivated cognition theory is therefore similar to the DPM and cohesion theories in seeing conservatism not in terms of personality but as a social attitudinal or ideological dimension that is an expression of basic motivational goals involving needs to manage threat and uncertainty and which is influenced by both personality and situational factors. It differs, however, from the DPM in seeing political conservatism as a single higher order dimension comprising both RWA and SDO, which are therefore seen as having the same motivational, personality, and situational bases. It also tends to differ from the cohesion influenced theories by seeing RWA as a more limited construct, involving only attitudes expressing resistance to change instead of a broader range of social attitudes favoring the subordination of individuals to group authority and cohesion.

These new models of authoritarianism therefore differ from the traditional authoritarian personality theories in seeing RWA and SDO as social attitude dimensions that express basic motivational goals or values, rather than as personality dimensions. While these new models see authoritarian attitudes as influenced by personality, they also strongly emphasize the causal influence of social factors as equally or indeed possibly even more important. And finally, these new models help to explain why authoritarian attitudes might cause prejudice, an issue that the traditional authoritarian personality approach largely glossed over. During the past decade, both the DPM and Jost's motivated cognition approach have generated a good deal of supportive research (for reviews, see Duckitt and Sibley, 2009; Jost, 2009).

Conclusions

The concept of an authoritarian personality to explain patterns of relatively stable individual differences in a broad range of social, political, and intergroup attitudes and reactions emerged

early in the twentieth century. Since then it has inspired a great deal of research and controversy, which have led to two important changes in conceptualization and measurement. One change was away from trying to measure the entire range of attitudes and beliefs originally seen as comprising the authoritarian syndrome on a single psychometric dimension. These early measures, such as the F, D, and C scales, invariably failed, and this led to the discovery that this broad social attitudinal domain comprised two distinct dimensions, which seem to comprehensively organize individuals' social, political, and intergroup attitudes and their many manifestations.

The second change has come more recently. This has involved challenging the conception of authoritarianism as personality, be it one dimension or two. New theories have emerged which see the two dimensions of authoritarianism, RWA and SDO, not as personality dimensions but rather as two distinct social attitudinal dimensions expressing two sets of motivationally based social values. The main focus of these newer theories has been to clarify the values that lie at the core of ideological attitude dimensions such as RWA and SDO, how situational, experiential, and personality factors might influence these dimensions, and how and why RWA and SDO in turn affect social and intergroup behavior.

See also: Aggression, Social Psychology of; Intergroup Relations; Levels of Analysis in Social Psychology; Racism: Social Psychological Perspectives; Social Dominance Orientation; Social Psychological Theory, History of; Social Psychology.

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